We study the asymptotic average minimum manipulating coalition size as a characteristic of quality of a voting rule and show its serious drawback. We suggest using the asymptotic average threshold coalition size instead. We prove that, in large electorates, the asymptotic average threshold coalition size is maximised among all scoring rules by the Borda rule when the number m of alternatives is 3 or 4, and by m/2 -approval voting when m ≥ 5.
Introduction
In [1973] [1974] [1975] Gibbard and Satterthwaite published a fundamental impossibility theorem which states that every non-dictatorial social choice function, whose range contains at least three alternatives, at certain profiles can be manipulated by a single individual (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) . After that, the natural question arose: if there are no perfect rules, which ones are the best, i.e. least manipulable? The answer to this question cannot be given in absolute terms. It stipulates introducing a certain index of manipulability of the rule and a certain model for the population. The answer may depend both on the choice of the index and on the choice of the model.
To answer this question, various indices of manipulability of voting rules have been introduced and studied (Aleskerov and Kurbanov 1999; Chamberlin 1985; lion's share of attention. The first one, impartial culture (IC) conjecture, assumes that all voters are independent. The second one, the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) conjecture, assumes some degree of dependency.
Among the indices, the probability of obtaining a manipulable profile either for an individual or for a coalition has attracted most attention, both for the IC and for the IAC conjectures (Chamberlin 1985; Lepelley and Mbih 1987; Nitzan 1985) .
In some cases, these indices have been calculated exactly, mainly in the threealternative case (Favardin et al. 2002; Lepelley and Mbih 1987, 1994; Lepelley and Valognes 2002) . In others, they have been estimated in computer simulations (Aleskerov and Kurbanov 1999; Chamberlin 1985; Kelly 1993; Nitzan 1985; Smith 1999) .
The probability of manipulation has been especially well-studied for the important class of scoring voting rules, and significant progress has been made in comparing them. In his seminal paper, Saari (1990) , showed that in his "geometric" model, Borda is the least manipulable for the three-alternative case in relation to micro manipulation, but this does not extend to the case of four alternatives. Kim and Roush (1996) , on the other hand, proved that, asymptotically, when the number of voters tends to infinity Borda becomes coalitionally manipulable with probability 1.
Some other characteristics have also been used, mostly in computer simulations (Aleskerov and Kurbanov 1999; Chamberlin 1985; Nitzan 1985) . In this paper, we originally aimed to compare scoring rules under the IC, using the average minimum size of the coalition capable of manipulation as the principal characteristic of manipulability of the rule. The greater this characteristic, the better the rule. This characteristic was first introduced by Chamberlin (1985) , where he estimated it for four different rules by means of computer simulation.
To our surprise we discovered that while Chamberlin's characteristic is meaningful for most classical rules, it is biased towards antiplurality, and the closer the rule gets to the antiplurality, the larger is its average minimum coalition size. Hence, there are no optimal rules in relation to this characteristic at all. We suggest using the asymptotic average threshold coalition size instead. This new characteristic coincides with the average minimum coalition size on classical rules but does not have the bias towards antiplurality. We show how to calculate the limiting value of this characteristic when n → ∞, and discuss which rule is optimal for large electorates. We prove that, among all scoring rules, Borda is the optimal rule in this sense in three-and four-alternative elections. When the number of alternatives m is five or more, m/2 -approval voting is optimal, where for each voter most preferred m/2 alternatives are considered approved.
Scoring rules
Let A and N be two finite sets of cardinality m and n, respectively. The elements of A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } will be called alternatives, the elements of N agents. We will denote agents as 1, 2, . . . , n. We assume that the agents have preferences over the set of alternatives. By L = L( A) we denote the set of all linear orders on A; they represent the preferences of agents over A. The elements of the Cartesian product
